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Key Points 
 The recent compulsory liquidation of British Steel raises a number of fundamental 
questions about the nature of compulsory liquidation. 
 Is it possible for compulsory liquidation to be used in a manner similar to 
administration to rescue (part of) a company’s undertaking with the costs of the 
process being picked up by the taxpayer rather than met by secured creditors? 
 In this article we consider the reasons why the court ordered the liquidation of 
British Steel and more broadly consider the nature of compulsory liquidation and 




Media outlets in Great Britain are frequently guilty of confusing administration with 
liquidation. To the eyes and ears of insolvency specialists, it often seems that most 
journalists are incapable of understanding that administration is a temporary procedure 
which companies may enter with the aim of being rescued or at least achieving for the 
company’s creditors a beneficial realisation of its assets. As can be seen from the evidence 
provided to the Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration, administration will often 
involve the running of the company’s business for a period of time with the object of selling 
the company’s business as a going concern along with (at least some of) its employees.  
Liquidation has a different set of priorities. Its aim is to wind up the company’s assets. There 
is no statutory requirement to consider rescue of the company. By definition, the company 




In recent times, we have seen two very large concerns, Carillion plc and British Steel Ltd 
(‘British Steel’) enter compulsory liquidation (that is, a winding up has been ordered by the 
court) when administration may have appeared to be a more likely route for the respective 
companies to take. In both cases the Official Receiver (‘OR’) was appointed automatically as 
liquidator. In both cases, private sector insolvency practitioners (‘IPs’) were appointed as 
special managers to assist the OR in conducting the winding-up. The Right Honourable Frank 
Field MP, chair of the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, is reported in the 
Times (7 February 2019) as commenting on the payment in fees of £44.2 million to special 
managers by the Government in the Carillion compulsory winding up in the following terms:  
“In this way they are ably assisted by a merry little bank of advisors and auditors, 
conflicted at every turn and with every incentive to milk the cash cow dry.” 
 
Although the court’s reasoning in ordering the liquidation of Carillion is not publically 
available, we do have the judgment of Snowden J in explaining his reasons for putting British 
Steel into compulsory winding up (Re British Steel Limited [2019] EWHC 1304 (Ch)). It is his 
Lordship’s decision which will be discussed here. Although there are a number of largely 
unexplored consequences of using compulsory liquidation in the circumstances of British 
Steel, this article will analyse the case in light of the previously accepted wisdom as to the 
purpose of compulsory liquidation and on whose behalf it is generally believed that 
compulsory winding up is carried out. It has been previously observed that administration is 
the new liquidation (A Keay, ‘The future for liquidation in light of the Enterprise Act 
reforms?’ [2005] JBL 143). This note will consider whether, equally, it is possible to observe 




British Steel, based in the North East of England, was one of Europe’s largest steelmakers 
with about 20 subsidiary companies and over 4,000 staff employed (with a further 1,300 
agency and sub-contact workers). Its accounts to March 2018 showed a turnover of nearly 
£1.2 billion but with a loss recorded of nearly £19 million. In the latter part of 2018, British 
Steel suffered a number of financial blows. There was a fall in sales causing severe cash flow 
difficulties. The decline in demand was partly a result of the uncertainties around Brexit, 
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competition from alternative suppliers in Europe, falling demand from car makers, and 
falling revenue from the French railway industry as well as an increase in commodity prices. 
In early 2019, British Steel’s free allocation of carbon credits under the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme was suspended by the EU pending approval of the UK’s draft withdrawal 
agreement. Although the UK Government stepped in to purchase carbon credits to 
surrender on British Steel’s behalf to prevent the company from being fined this did not 
assist the company’s finances as it had previously raised finance on its carbon credit 
allocation. 
 
British Steel had potentially two main sources of credit available to it but both facilities were 
in default and neither its asset-based lenders nor its parent companies were willing to 
provide any further financial support. The UK Government was approached for assistance 
including support to fund a possible administration process. In the absence of confirmation 
that such support would be on a commercial basis such state aid was not forthcoming.  
The company had cash sufficient for less than one week’s continued trading. The directors 
of British Steel petitioned for the winding up of British Steel on the grounds that it was 
unable to pay its debts according to the meaning of that phrase found in section 122(1)(f) of 




The Court was satisfied that British Steel was, or would in the immediate future be, unable 
to pay its debts as they fell due and so made a winding-up order. Evidence from the 
directors was that unsecured creditors were unlikely to receive any dividend in the 
company’s insolvency beyond the maximum payment of £600,000 under the prescribed 
part provisions of section 176A of IA 1986. 
 
An immediate winding-up order (without the usual notice to creditors under rule 7.10(1) of 
the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (‘the Rules’)) was appropriate due to the 
trading difficulties (the grounds mentioned under section 122(1)(f)). However, in addition to 
finding the company to be insolvent, the Court also recognised the significant 
environmental and health and safety issues connected to British Steel’s business. The Court 
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stated that, without careful and continued supervision, there was a risk of gas explosion, a 
safety risk of flooding to surrounding areas as well as the inherent dangers of having very 
significant amounts of hazardous materials on site. 
 
The possibility of placing the company into administration rather than liquidation was briefly 
discussed. It was not seen as a viable option on the facts. The asset-based lenders, who 
were the only creditors entitled to appoint administrators out of court under their security, 
did not agree to fund an administration. A majority of them did, however, support the 
proposed liquidation with the OR, a Government employee, being appointed automatically 
as liquidator.  As an aside it may be useful to be aware that although ORs are members of 
the Insolvency Service and usually act as civil servants within the Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (‘BEIS’) before they are appointed, but they cease, when 
appointed: 
“to be civil servants in the proper sense of servants of the Crown employed in the 
business of government within (in this case) a department of state.” (Re Minotaur 
Data Systems Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 766 at 772, per Aldous LJ). 
 
Due to the potential environmental and health and safety issues, neither Ernst & Young, 
which had been advising the asset-based lenders, nor PwC, which had been advising British 
Steel, were prepared to accept appointment as administrators. 
 
Immediately after the winding-up order was made, the OR applied for the appointment of 
special managers. The OR’s request was on the grounds that the OR's office did not itself 
have either the necessary expertise or manpower to cover the various tasks likely to be 
necessary in the liquidation. The Court appointed partners in Ernst & Young as special 
managers. The special managers provided a letter to the Court that they were satisfied that 
in accordance with their professional conduct obligations they did not have any conflicts of 
interest by reason of having acted for the asset-based lenders. The details of the order 







In a nutshell, liquidation is a process whereby the assets of a company are collected and 
realised, the resulting proceeds are applied in discharging all its debts and liabilities, and any 
balance which remains after paying the costs and expenses of winding up is distributed 
among the members according to their rights and interests, or otherwise dealt with as the 
constitution of the company directs (Ayerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167); 
typically it is a process which prepares the company for its dissolution. There are several 
grounds on which liquidation may be ordered by a court but by far the most common is an 
inability of the company to pay its debts, that is, insolvency. The party who normally seeks a 
winding-up order on the basis of insolvency is a creditor. Interestingly in the case of British 
Steel the directors of the company were the petitioners who sought the order. This is 
unusual, although far from unheard of. Given the fact that the thinking at the time of the 
winding-up order was for the company’s business to continue to run and then to be sold as 
a going concern (R Davies, ‘What went wrong at British Steel?’ Guardian, 22 May 2019), it is, 
at first blush, somewhat surprising that the company decided to seek a winding-up order as 
one might be justified in taking the view that administration would have been more 
suitable.  
 
The explanation of the reason for what transpired is that to enter administration there must 
be an IP willing to act as administrator and, of course, that appointment may have to be 
funded if there are not likely to be sufficient funds available in the company to cover 
expenses and remuneration. As Snowden J remarked, the asset-based lenders, who were 
the only creditors able to appoint an administrator, were not willing to fund an 
administration (at [13]). Also, neither of two of the ‘big four accounting firms’ (which 
undertake large scale insolvencies and had been involved with British Steel prior to the 
petition to court) were willing to take on the role of administrator. The reason for this 
appears to be the potential environmental and health and safety issues to which the 
company's business gives rise (at [13]). Of course, British Steel could have instigated 
administration itself, either out of court or by obtaining a court order. Possibly it did not 




Given the circumstances facing British Steel and its creditors it might be thought that a 
winding-up order with the concomitant appointment of three Ernst & Young partners as 
special managers was the best way forward, and certainly Snowden J was willing to accede 
both to the petition and to the application for the appointment of special managers. While 
this might be thought to be a practical solution to a difficult situation it does raise some 
issues and poses some interesting questions.  
 
First, liquidation is an insolvency regime that is designed to have the assets of the company 
sold off as expeditiously as possible and for any businesses which the company operates to 
be wound up. According to the Privy Council in Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings Plc ([2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 
1 AC 508; [2006] 3 WLR 689): ‘The purpose of bankruptcy [and liquidation by analogy] 
proceedings … is… to provide a mechanism of collective execution against the property of 
the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established.’ Thus, winding-up is a 
collective procedure designed to bring about the distribution of the assets to the creditors 
according to their pre-liquidation entitlements; at the core of liquidation is distribution of 
the assets. Yet, the rationale for the British Steel liquidation appears not to be to provide for 
a distribution as Snowden J was told that the unsecured creditors are unlikely to get 
anything from the liquidation save, possibly, a share of the prescribed part, under section 
176A of the IA 1986, which would constitute a maximum of £600,000. Rather, the reason 
was concern over environmental and health and safety issues and the possible liability of an 
officeholder (at [11]) together with the fact that the secured creditors would not take any 
action through any of the avenues open to them, such as administration.  
 
Unlike administration which often involves having as an aim the continued running of a 
company’s business in order to secure a buyer, liquidation is not a regime with such an aim 
and so the use of liquidation might appear surprising. However, perhaps the making of a 
winding-up order is not as surprising in this case as it first seems to be. The courts have 
stated that while liquidation is, from a financial point of view, carried out for the benefit of 
the creditors, it is a public act or process in which the public has an interest. In the Court of 
Appeal in Whitehouse v Wilson ([2006] EWCA Civ 1688; [2007] BPIR 230) all of the members 
of the Court emphasised the public interest in the liquidation process. Earlier, Robert 
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Walker LJ (as he then was), sitting in the Court of Appeal in Faryab v Smith ([2001] BPIR 
246), observed that there was a public interest in pursuit of meritorious claims in a 
bankruptcy and, by analogy, liquidation.  
 
Liquidation plays a vital public role (A Keay, ‘Insolvency Law: A Matter of Public Interest?’ 
(2000) 51 NILQ 509; R Mokal, ‘What Liquidation Does For Secured Creditors, And What It 
Does For You’ (2008) 71 MLR 699) and it is particularly the case where either a company is 
hopelessly insolvent, as it is not good for the public to have such companies operating in 
society, or where, on the petition of the Secretary of State for BEIS under section 124A of 
the IA 1986, a court is convinced that a company should be wound up as it is just and 
equitable so to do. Although British Steel was clearly insolvent and Snowden J so found, it is 
questionable whether one would say that it was hopelessly insolvent. Yet, while Snowden J 
said nothing about the public interest, perhaps it was felt that there was a public interest 
factor in the case, and this might have been the concern that was expressed in relation to 
environmental and health and safety issues (at [11]). 
 
Of course, one interpretation of what has happened could be that British Steel is nothing 
more than an unusual case, involving a company that has, as set out in the judgment, a 
complex business (at [20]), and it is a case that will be replicated very rarely, if at all. After 
saying that, perhaps it is not so much of a one-off as one might think. It was only on 15 
January 2018 that a winding-up order was made in relation to Carillion after the company 
had sought such an order. Again, this was an insolvency that one might have thought would 
have been handled via administration and not liquidation, and one in relation to which no 
private sector IPs were ready to take up an appointment. 
 
Are British Steel and Carillion forerunners of a new era where we see liquidation become 
more prevalent in situations where administration once was employed and expected? Is 
compulsory liquidation the new administration, particularly where public interest issues are 
involved? Does British Steel provide a signal that more companies might be forced to seek a 
liquidation order rather than enter administration, perhaps because of the existence of 
concerns over some aspect of their business or because no IP will take on an appointment 
as administrator? This situation might occur as, arguably, public interest issues are involved 
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in many insolvencies and particularly where large companies are concerned. For instance, 
the insolvency of a large company can devastate a local or even a regional area. Take MG 
Rover as an example where the administration of the company caused great upheaval in 
parts of Birmingham to employees, their families and facilities in the local community. The 
large amounts that are owed by large companies might mean that secured creditors will not 
be willing to fund administration and if that is the case compulsory liquidation is the only 
alternative. This begs the normative question whether compulsory liquidation should be 
employed in this kind of case. 
 
Clearly there might be advantages in entering liquidation compared with administration in a 
case like British Steel, at least for the secured creditors. First, where a company like British 
Steel has environmental obligations, a liquidator, unlike an administrator, would be able to 
disclaim an asset that produces such obligations, as in the case of Re Celtic Extraction Ltd 
([1999] 2 BCLC 555). A liquidator could disclaim any of the company’s property that would 
attract environmental obligations and this would move the risk of environmental clean-up 
or other action from the creditors to the public. Here it would be the secured creditors who 
benefit from the disclaimer. 
 
Secondly, there is a possible advantage as far as costs are concerned. It is not clear who will 
end up paying for the liquidation if British Steel’s business is unable to be sold, or even if it 
can be sold. The cost of a liquidation will figure as a preferential payment under rule 7.108 
of the Rules, but any claim for costs can only be recovered in relation to unsecured 
property, save for costs related to the preservation and sale of secured property (Buchler v 
Talbot ([2004] UKHL 9; [2004] 2 AC 298). The only use that the OR could make of assets that 
are charged is to pursue litigation in some circumstances (see section 176ZA). The House of 
Lords said in Buchler v Talbot that generally each fund, that is, the fund covering secured 
property on the one hand, and the fund that relates to unsecured property on the other, 
bears its own costs and, as the chargeholder/secured creditor has no interest in the 
liquidation (dealing with unsecured property), it should not have to contribute towards the 
liquidation expenses (at [30] and [31]). It would seem likely that many secured creditors in 
cases like British Steel would stand aside and not instigate administration so that the 
company has to enter liquidation, and by doing this they save themselves the cost of paying 
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an administrator and the aggravation of having to make decisions about the administration. 
They would have to bear the costs of the preservation and sale of the secured property if an 
administration occurred so what difference does it make if the company enters liquidation? 
They do not potentially have the same control as in administration but does it really matter? 
They have the advantage of not being liable for the costs, which with large companies are 
difficult to estimate. 
 
There are likely to be many costs that cannot be directly related to the preservation and 
realisation of secured property and so these will have to be paid out of the prescribed part 
or the public purse. What is of particular interest is who is going to pay the fees of the 
special managers, because this is likely to be where one of the major costs will lie. Snowden 
J recognised that the value of the business was limited to the value of the assets available  
to the unsecured creditors which under the section 176A prescribed part provisions was a 
maximum of £600,000 (at [22]).  Should the unsecured creditors, in effect, be required to 
pay for the special managers when undoubtedly part of the work of the special managers 
will be administering property over which the secured creditors have charges? Should their 
fees not be partly paid out of the secured property? 
 
Clearly there will be other costs, in addition to those of the special managers and their 
remuneration, namely the expenses of the OR who may engage other parties. One assumes 
that these costs, once the £600,000 prescribed part is used up, will have to be paid out of 
the public purse.   This seems unfair when, as is the case with British Steel, there is a lot of 
money tied up in assets, but they are secured to the hilt. It seems almost certain that the 
majority of the costs of the special managers (and others) will be paid by the taxpayer which 
may lead to similar commentary as that made by Frank Field in the context of the Carillion 
liquidation quoted in the Introduction above. 
 
It is notable that Ernst & Young were not willing to act as administrators (and one would 
assume liquidators) because there were potential environmental and health and safety 
issues to which the company's business gave rise, yet they were willing to act as special 
managers. Does this mean that any risk in relation to the health and safety concerns are 
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externalised and are placed, in effect, on the public purse and not the private sector in the 
form of the secured lenders or the IP, and if so, is that appropriate? 
 
The facts of British Steel suggest that the company is being liquidated for the sole benefit of 
the secured lenders and the public may well end up funding, at least in part, a liquidation 
that will only bear fruit for the lenders. It is not clear from the judgment how the debt to the 
asset-based lenders is secured. If they have the benefit of legal title to chattels and debts, 
these assets will fall outside the assets of the company altogether. They will not be subject 
to the floating charge prescribed part deductions under section 176A and will not be 
available to fund the costs of the liquidation (and would not have been available to any 
administrator had the company entered administration). The widespread use of asset-based 
lending, whereby assets fall outside any floating charge as they are not assets of the 
company, limits the assets available to fund any potential rescue of a company. There is a 
strong argument in favour of limiting the rights of such asset-based lenders to those of a 
floating charge holder (P Walton ‘Fixed and floating charges: the Great British fund-off?’ 
(2015) 8 CR & I 18-21). It remains possible that in the future, where creditors are asset-
based lenders, such creditors will favour a compulsory liquidation rather than an 
administration. No IP will take office as administrator if the IP is not going to get paid. If the 
company’s free assets are likely to be no more than the maximum prescribed part under 
section 176A (£600,000) there would be no incentive for an IP to take a large administration 
appointment. It makes far more commercial sense to put the company into compulsory 
liquidation with the IP being appointed as special manager whereby the IP’s fees will be 
underwritten by the taxpayer as, appears to be the situation, in the cases of British Steel 
and Carillion. 
 
Ordinarily when a winding up order is made it is envisaged that the liquidator will liquidate 
the assets of the company in a timely fashion. Is it appropriate for a company to enter 
liquidation when there is a hope, if not a strategy, that the company’s business is disposed 
of? Is that not the role of administration? Liquidation is not a regime, unlike administration, 
that embraces as an aim the continued running of a company’s business in order to secure a 
buyer, and certainly it is not the norm for a liquidator to continue to keep a company’s 
business operating, certainly for a period of any length. However, there is no law which 
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governs the period that a liquidator may conduct a business and, according to the IA 1986, a 
liquidator is empowered to carry on the business of the company so far as may be necessary 
for its beneficial winding up (para 5 of Sch 4). While in Re Wreck Recovery & Salvage Co 
((1880) 15 ChD 353 at 362) Thesiger LJ said that the liquidator's statutory authority to carry 
on business is to be construed liberally, the power is only to be exercised where it is clearly 
necessary and will benefit the winding up, and it does not cover activity that involves 
speculation with the assets in the hope of making a profit for the benefit of the creditors or 
shareholders. In this context ‘necessary’ means something more than beneficial, and it will 
be determined by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case (Re Wreck 
Recovery & Salvage Co at 360). The Court in Re Centralcast Engineering Ltd ([2000] BCC 727) 
held that a liquidator needs to have reasonable grounds for believing that carrying on the 
business is beneficial or else he or she may be held personally liable for any loss sustained. 
 
As the foregoing suggests, there are a lot of questions that the ordering of the winding up of 
British Steel has precipitated and at the moment the decision to wind up British Steel leaves 
many issues unresolved. It will be interesting to see what unravels with the liquidation 
process, and if any more of the same ilk eventuate. 
 
 
